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The European Credit Market and Institutions 
 
1.  Introduction  
It has recently become very clear to what extent well-developed and accessible credit markets and 
institutions may be an important condition to economic growth. Banks and other financial institutions 
are supposed to guarantee the financing of productive investments and activities, as they mobilise and 
allocate financial resources and also by their specific money-creation processes through bank credit. 
At the same time, well-functioning markets and financial institutions may decrease the transaction 
costs and asymmetric information problems. They also play an increasingly important role in 
identifying investment opportunities, selecting the most profitable projects, mobilising savings, 
facilitating trading and by the diversification of risk, as well as improving corporate governance 
mechanisms. More efficient credit sectors may also represent a necessary and important condition for 
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.  
During recent decades, the European credit market and institutions have had to embrace very deep 
structural changes. The European Economic Community (EEC) of ten rich member-countries at the 
beginning of the 1980s has grown into today’s enlarged European Union (EU) of 27 rich, less rich and 
even quite poor European countries. Furthermore, the introduction of the single currency accelerated 
the process of consolidation and financial integration, not only in the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) countries, but in the EU as a whole, in which the twelve newest member-states also have a 
voice, in spite of the possibly heterogeneous nature of their financial systems. 
Thus, the process of financial integration is, on one hand, a necessary pre-requisite for the adoption of 
the single currency and the implementation of the single monetary policy, with the predominance of 
the banking intermediation in the context of the EU. On the other hand, this process raises the potential   3
to incite liquidity crises, such as the one that we currently face. Crises of such a nature are contagious 
and affect the increasingly integrated European financial system.   
The introduction of the EMU increased competition and reduced some of the competitive advantages 
of local and national banks, which were based on factors such as currency risk, a lack of price 
transparency and a better knowledge of national monetary policy.  
The European credit markets have also faced some common trends in the context of the pressures 
exerted by globalisation, which include the process of disintermediation, the adoption of new 
technologies, the deregulation of financial services and in particular, the increased competition in all 
segments of the financial product market and banking services.  
Despite all the changes and disintermediation, the asset structure of EU banks reflects the rapid 
increase in lending that has occurred during the last decades, particularly since the advent of the EMU. 
It is a process that started before the implementation of the single currency and reflects the growing 
demand for credit provoked by the general downward trend of interest rates, above all in those 
countries where interest rates were rather high during the 1980s and the 1990s and were forced to 
converge to the levels of other EU countries. 
Following these vectors of research, this paper seeks to contribute to the analysis of the European 
credit market and institutions during recent decades.  The paper’s main contributions are to be found 
in: 
1)  its study of the evolution of the European bank lending, using an adaptation of the 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model, which allows us to consider not only the 
macroeconomic conditions, but also to take into account the importance of the bank- 
performance conditions, here represented by four ratios: bank deposits/GDP; bonds and 
money market instruments/GDP; foreign assets/GDP; and foreign assets/foreign liabilities; 
2)  its use of panel estimates with quarterly data for all EU countries over a  relatively long 
time period, from 1988 to 2006, in contrast with most of the studies in this area, which   4
focus mainly on the evolution of some more relevant countries in recent years, particularly 
since the advent of the EMU; 
3)  we also take into account the structural changes due not only to the EU’s substantial 
enlargement, but  also to the single market and the EMU, by comparing the results obtained 
for  three panels of countries in different time periods: 
•  A first panel with quarterly data, between Q1 1980 and Q3 2006 for 26 EU 
member-countries (Luxembourg is excluded, as it was not possible to obtain all the 
data for this country);  
•  A second panel with the subset of quarterly data, for the time period Q1 1980-Q4 
1998 and only for 11 “old” EU member-countries; 
•  A third panel with another subset, now only with more recent quarterly data, 
(between Q1 1999 and Q3 2006) and again for all of the 26 EU countries, as 
indicated above.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the contextual setting and the 
relevant literature; the methodological framework and the data are presented in Section 3; Section 4 
displays the results obtained; finally in Section 5, we make our concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  Contextual Setting and Literature  
The profound changes taking place in Europe reflect, on one hand, the remarkable enlargement of the 
EU since the 1980s and particularly during the last decade, which brought the simultaneous entry of 
ten countries in 2004, followed shortly after by two more countries. On the other hand, the adoption of 
the single currency and a common monetary policy have had a profound impact, not only in the Euro   5
area, but also throughout the entire EU-27, where the financial sector has experienced an increased 
integration and an intensification of competition in banking services. 
Some authors have already analysed the degrees of integration through the common trends which may 
be identified in the context of the pressures of globalisation and which affect all the EU countries (not 
only the EMU members) with particular intensity, due to the process of disintermediation, new 
technologies and increased competition (Belaisch et al., 2001; Gardener et al., 2002; Melnik and 
Nissim, 2006; Romero-Ávila, 2007).  
The increasingly competitive environment of the EU banking sector and the process of concentration, 
as well as the decline in the number of banks in almost all EU countries, did not eliminate much of the 
excess capacity in the system. Moreover, there is evidence that large banks may continue to have 
efficiency advantages over the smaller banks (Altunbas et al., 1997; Cabral et al., 2002; Casu and 
Molyneaux, 2000; Jansen and de Haan, 2003; Molyneaux, 2003; Baele et al., 2004; Romero-Ávila, 
2007).  
In Barros et al. (2007), the efficiency of almost 1400 commercial banks operating in the EU between 
1993 and 2001 was analysed. The study confirmed the importance of country-level characteristics and 
firm-level features to explain the probability of a bank being a best (worst) performer. In particular, 
the findings pointed to the possibility that smaller-sized banks with higher loan intensity and foreign 
banks from countries upholding common law traditions have a higher probability of best performance. 
It is generally recognised that nowadays, special attention must be paid to the EU banking sector 
following the most recent enlargements mentioned above, particularly regarding those countries under 
the former Soviet Union’s sphere of influence, given that in a quite short period of time, the banks in 
these countries moved away from the socialist structure of banking, in which the financial 
organisations were used to support the central banking system, to a market economy and the 
concomitant decentralisation and liberalisation of the banking systems.    6
In most of these Eastern and Central European countries, forms and programmes were introduced to 
amend property rights, together with processes of privatisations of part of the State property. As a 
result, the importance of the private sector and firms increased in these countries, as did the 
particularly relevant role of their financial intermediaries and banking institutions. There is a fairly 
strong consensus on the increased performance and efficiency of the banks under the new market 
conditions in these countries. Several studies (Holscher, 2000; Hanousek and Kocenda, 2003; Stephen 
and Backhaus, 2003; Dimitrova, 2004; Bonin and Watchel, 2004; Bonin et al, 2005; Freis and Taci, 
2005; Fries et al., 2006) confirm the relevant improvements in efficiency of the banking systems of the 
new EU members and the effects of ownership, concluding that foreign-owned banks are usually more 
cost-efficient.  
Other studies examine how, and to what extent, the banking sectors of the new member-states have 
integrated with those of the older EU members and the process of nominal and real convergence of 
these countries to EU standards (ECB, 2004 and 2005; Kocenda et al., 2006). 
The transmission of monetary policy to the non-monetary economic sectors also requires more 
efficient banking and the way that banks adapt lending in response to monetary policy decisions varies 
according to their specific political and economic environment. Some contributions analyse the 
transmission channels of monetary policy in different EU countries, including the new member-states 
in Central and Eastern Europe (Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Golinelli and Rovelli, 2005; Elbourne 
and de Haan, 2006; Ferreira, 2007, 2008). However, in spite of all the theoretical and empirical 
advances in this area, there is still no agreement about the precise specification of the ways in which 
monetary policy and credit lending influences the economy (Goddart et al. 2007).  
According to the credit view, monetary policy decisions will affect not only the credit demand side, 
through the balance sheet channel, but also the supply side, through the bank lending channel. More 
precisely, for instance, the tightening of monetary policy, through the balance sheet channel will make 
external finance more costly for borrowers, with the increase of their interest expenses and the   7
reduction of their collateral while, through the bank lending channel, the reduction of the banks’ 
liquidity will force banking institutions to reduce lending. 
However, such a reduction also reflects the banks’ characteristics and the environment in which banks 
are operating. Lending by smaller and relatively under-capitalised or illiquid banks is usually more 




3.  Methodological Framework and Data Used  
3.1. The Model 
In our analysis, we will use a version of the Bernanke and Blinder (1988) model, which we develop in 
Appendix I of this paper (with all the variables in natural logarithms).   
Basically, in the money market, we will assume that money equals deposits held at banks by the non-
monetary sectors. So, for the demand function, we assume that the nominal deposits held in banks by 
the private sector will depend on the GDP and the interest rate on bonds:  
where: 
Dep
d = deposits, d meaning demand 
GDP = Growth Domestic Product 
ibonds = interest rate on bonds 
 
Money supply will depend not only on the interest rate on bonds, but also on the influence of monetary 
policy (represented here by the relevant monetary policy interest rate, which is defined by the Central 
Bank): 
 
() 1                                                             i    GDP    Dep   bonds 2 1 0
d α α α + + =
( )       2                                                                     i   i   Dep mon.pol. 2 bonds 1 0
s β β β + + =  8
now: 
Dep
s = deposits, s meaning supply 
ibonds = interest rate on bonds 
imon.pol. = monetary policy interest rate  
 
In the credit market, the demand for lending depends on the GDP, the interest rate on bonds and the 
interest rate on lending/borrowing: 
where: 
Lend
d = lending, d meaning demand 
GDP = Growth Domestic Product 
ilend = interest rate on lending 
ibonds = interest rate on bonds 
 
 
Assuming the relevance of one or more bank-performance characteristics (Charx) to lending, we may 
define the supply in the money market as depending on the deposits of the private sectors in banks, as 





s = lending, s meaning supply 
Dep = bank deposits of the private sector 
Carx = bank characteristics (x = 1,..X) 
ilend = interest rate on lending 
ibonds = interest rate on bonds 
 
Clearing the money and credit markets leads to the reduced form of the model (see Appendix I for 
more details on calculations) and, more precisely, to the equation that will explain the bank-lending 
growth: 
() 3                                                  i       i       GDP         Lend bonds 3 lend 2 1 0
d χ χ χ χ + + + =
() 4                                             i       i       Car       Dep         Lend bonds 4 lend 3 x 2x 1 0




Lend = bank lending 
GDP = Growth Domestic Product 
imon.pol. = monetary policy interest rate  
Carx = bank characteristics  (x = 1,..X) 
 
 
3.2. The Data 
We use Eurostat and International Financial Statistics (IFS) quarterly data for EU countries during the 
time period from Q1 1999 to Q3 2006 and we build three panels:  
1) A first panel with quarterly data, between Q1 1980 and Q3 2006 (107 quarters) for all 26 EU 
member states, amounting to 2782 observations. As mentioned previously, Luxembourg has 
been excluded, as it was not possible to collect all the necessary data for this country;   
2) A second panel with a subset of this data (836 observations), for the time period between the 
beginning of the 1980s and the advent of the EMU (107 quarters, between Q1 1980 and Q4 
1998) and only for 11 “old” EU member-countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.; 
3) A third panel with another subset, now only with more recent quarterly data, (31 quarters 
between Q1 1999 and Q3 2006) and again for all of the 26 EU countries, amounting to 806 
observations.  
 
For the dependent variable (bank lending), we use the natural logarithm of the ratio of the domestic 
credit provided by the banking institutions to GDP. To explain the growth of this bank lending, we 
will consider (always in natural logarithms): 
()                     5                                          Car   i   GDP   L x 3x mon.pol 2 1 0 ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ + + + =  10
•  The real GDP per capita, representing the macroeconomic conditions of the different EU 
countries; 
•  The discount rate (end of the period), which is the monetary policy interest rate;   
•  The ratio deposits to GDP, that is, the total deposits in the banking institutions which are 
important sources of resources for credit lending. For instance, according to the 
macroeconomic money multiplier mechanism, bank lending will mainly depend on the 
collected deposits and the legal minimum reserves; 
•  The ratio of the bonds and money market instruments to GDP, as a proxy of the development 
of the financial markets in these countries, which are mostly bank-dominated. Since healthy 
financial markets and developed financial institutions are a guarantee for the direct and indirect 
financing of the bank clients’ activities, we may expect that this ratio will exert a positive 
influence on bank activities and support bank lending; 
•  The ratio foreign assets to GDP, introducing the influence of the other countries, more 
specifically, the financial resources obtained from foreign partners, represented by the entry of 
assets, in particular to pay their debts and financial obligations and consequently, more 
resources to be applied in the domestic bank lending; 
•  The ratio foreign assets to foreign liabilities, representing the financial situation of the banking 
institutions towards other countries, as they may receive payments from foreign debtors. On 
the other hand, they also have financial obligations towards foreign creditors, which implies 
the payment of debts and obligations to other countries. Therefore, the influence of this ratio on 
bank lending will reveal not only the openness of the financial markets, but moreover, the 
degree of dependence on the other countries’ financial resources.  
 
In Appendix II, we present the summary statistics of these series, while the matrix of the correlations 
is reported in Appendix III.   11
 
3.3. Unit Root Tests 
The number of observations of the collected data to build our three panels does not lend itself to the 
application of single time series unit root tests. Therefore, we opt to use panel unit root tests, which are 
more adequate in this case. These tests not only increase the power of unit root tests due to the span of 
the observations, but also minimise the risks of structural breaks due to deep changes during the 
considered time period.  
From among the available panel unit root tests, we choose the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test, which 
may be viewed as a pooled Dickey-Fuller test or as an augmented Dickey-Fuller test when lags are 
included, the null hypothesis being the existence of non-stationarity. This test is adequate for 
heterogeneous panels of moderate sise, such as the present cases and it assumes that there is a common 
unit root process.   
The results obtained are reported in Appendix III and clearly allow us to reject the existence of the null 
hypothesis for all the variables included in the three considered panels. 
 
 
4.  Empirical Estimations 
Using the presented reduced form of the model (equation 5 ) and the series described above, we will 
analyse the evolution of bank lending and the relevant macroeconomic conditions, as well as to some 
specific characteristics of the banking institutions and indicators representing their performance 
conditions, by the estimation of the following equation (all variables in natural logarithms): 
   12
 (Bank Lending/GDP) it = ϕ 0 + ϕ 1 real GDP per cap.it + ϕ 2 Interest rate it + ϕ 3 (Deposits/GDP) it 
+ ϕ 4 (Bonds and Money Market Instruments/GDP) it + ϕ 5 (Foreign Assets/GDP) it + ϕ 6 (Foreign 
Assets/Foreign Liabilities) it + ηi + νt + uit  
 
Where: 
i = 1,..., N  = number of EU countries included in each panel 
t = 1, T = number of the considered quarters 
ηi = country dummies 
νt = time (quarter) dummies 
uit = error term 
 
Following Wooldridge (2002), in our estimations we opt to use a panel data approach which not only 
provides more observations for estimations, but also reduces the possibility of multi-colinearity among 
the different variables. With pooled total, ordinary least squares (OLS) robust estimates, we test the 
degree of integration, assuming a common intercept and a single set of slope coefficients for all the 
panel observations.  
For each of the presented panels, we report (in Table 1) consistent results for the two estimated 
equations: a first that includes all the considered explaining variables and a second equation not 
including the ratio bonds and money market instruments to GDP, the variable that we used as a proxy 
of the development of the financial markets and which revealed a less homogenous behaviour.  
 
(Take in Table 1) 
   13
The best results were obtained without any lagged variables
1, indicating the almost immediate reaction 
of bank lending growth to the real per-capita GDP growth, the monetary policy interest rate and the 
four bank-performance indicators and conditions included in our model. 
The reported results reveal not only consistency, but also similar explanations of bank lending growth 
and almost all the presented variables in the EU countries during the considered time periods. 
The only exception is the ratio of the bonds and money market instruments to GDP. According to the 
results obtained in our panel III we can conclude that, since the advent of the EMU, this ratio grew in 
line with bank credit as it also did in the past at least in the subset of 11 “old” EU countries included in 
our panel II. But this behaviour is not homogenous and we can not generalize the conclusions for the 
entire time period and all the EU countries included in our panel I.  
On the other side,  in all situations the ratio foreign assets to foreign liabilities has an opposite 
evolution of bank lending growth, revealing the high degree of foreign dependence and indebtedness 
of the EU financial systems during this period. 
All the other explanatory variables grow in line with bank lending.  
The similar evolution of the monetary policy interest rate and  bank lending is not a surprise, in view 
of the fact that during this period, all of the central banks, and particularly the ECB after the advent of 
the single currency, maintained interest rates at historically low levels, thereby contributing to the 
growth of the ratio bank lending to GDP.  
 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
This paper confirms the high degree of integration among the EU financial systems, as well as the 
importance of bank-performance conditions to the bank credit in the EU countries during recent years.  
                                                      
1 The results of the estimations including lagged variables are available from the author upon request.   14
We contribute to the existing empirical evidence by introducing into an adaptation of the Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988) model not only the real GDP per capita and the monetary policy interest rate, but 
also some specific variables representing the bank performance conditions, to explain bank lending to 
GDP, namely, the ratio bank deposits/GDP; the ratio bonds and money market instruments/GDP, the 
ratio foreign assets/GDP and the ratio foreign assets/foreign liabilities. 
We compare the results obtained for three panels of EU countries during different time periods: a first 
panel with quarterly data between Q1 1980 and Q3 2006 for all 26 EU member-states (the only 
exclusion is Luxembourg, for which it was not possible to obtain all the data); a second panel with the 
subset of quarterly data for the time period Q1 1980-Q4 1998 and only for 11 “old” EU member-
countries and finally a third panel with another subset, now only with more recent quarterly data, 
(between Q1 1999 and Q3 2006) and again for all the 26 EU countries.  
The consistency of the results obtained, using pooled OLS robust panel estimations, allows us to 
conclude that the EU banking institutions have similar reactions to the variations of the 
macroeconomic conditions, in particular to the monetary policy interest rates as well as to the 
variations of the bank-performance conditions. The results also confirm the importance of these 
variables to bank lending growth (more precisely, the growth of the ratio of the domestic credit 
provided by the banking institutions to GDP) in the EU countries.  
In all situations, the macroeconomic conditions, here represented by the real GDP per capita and the 
monetary policy interest rate, were favourable to bank lending growth.  
Furthermore, the results obtained with the inclusion of bank-performance conditions allow us to state 
that: 
•  the growth of the ratio deposits to GDP increases in line with bank lending growth, confirming 
the intermediate role of financial institutions and the fact that the capacity to attract savings (in 
the form of deposits) is always a good condition in which to provide credit to those who need 
financing;    15
•  the behaviour of the growth of the ratio bonds and money market instruments to GDP, which 
can be considered as a proxy of the development of the financial markets in the EU countries, 
is less homogeneous. Although at least for some EU countries the ratio did not always grow in 
line with bank credit, nowadays they increase in the same direction confirming not only of the 
fact that the EU financial markets continue to be bank-dominated, but also that the 
development of the financial systems is usually a good condition for the direct and indirect 
financing of bank clients’ activities; 
•  as expected, the growth of the ratio foreign assets to GDP also exerts a positive influence on 
the bank lending growth, as the entry of foreign assets received from the other countries 
increases the resources to concede credit to the domestic banks’ clients; 
•  the growth of the ratio foreign assets to foreign liabilities contributes negatively to the 
domestic bank lending growth, revealing not only the openness of the financial markets,  but 
more importantly, their indebtedness and the dependence of the EU banking institutions on 
other countries’ financial resources. 
 
Finally, it is clear that the total credit provided by the EU banking institutions depends on the macro-
economic conditions, and particularly on monetary-policy decisions. At the same time, bank lending is 
an essential transmission channel of monetary policy decisions, but it still depends on the performance 
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APPENDIX I 
With reference to the model presented in Section 3 of this paper, demand in the money market depends on real 
GDP and the interest rate on bonds, while supply depends on the interest rate on bonds, in addition to the interest 





Demand in the credit market depends on real GDP, the interest rate on lending and also on the interest rate on 
bonds. 
 
Including another (or more) variable(s), which will capture the bank-specific performances, the credit supply 
will depend on the private-sector deposits at banks, the bank performance indicator(s), the interest rate on 












                          
2                  i   b i   b b Dep
     
1        i    a GDP   a a Dep
mon.pol. 2 bonds 1 0
s






                   
4           i   d     i   d     Car    d     Dep   d     d   Lend
  3      i    c     i   c      GDP   c     c   Lend
bonds 4 lend 3 x 2 1 0
s
bonds 3 lend 2 1 0
d
+ + + + =
+ + + =
[]
                     
5                     i   e          GDP    e        e    i
or
  i  
b a
b
       GDP
b a
a
      
b a
a b
   i


















                       
6                     i   f        GDP    f        f    D
or
  i  
b a
b a
       GDP
b a
a























s d  19









Bearing in mind the definitions obtained for the interest rate on bonds and deposits - equations [5] and [6]  
 
 
and introducing these expressions into equation [8], we may obtain the reduced form of the expression for 
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APPENDIX II – Summary Statistics  
PANEL I 
(26 EU countries, time period: Q1 1980 – Q4 2006) 
VARIABLES  
(all in natural 
logarithms) 
Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max Observations
Bank 
Lending/GDP: 
      
overall  .8322505  .9774401  -3.238277  4.37402  N = 2782 
between    .8238988  -1.006885  2.711879          i = 26 
within    .5499574  -1.654911  2.822849  T = 107 
Real GDP per 
capita: 
      
overall  3.860671     3.361557       0    14.86861  N = 2782 
between    2.089688     1.222639     11.8036  i = 26 
within    2.664528    -5.642677    9.536155  T = 107 
Interest rate:        
overall  1.641378     .9839171     -.02703      5.70378  N = 2782 
between    .4913641     .7124381     2.54158  i = 26 
within       T  =  107 
Deposits/GDP:        
overall  .9377853     1.393441     -2.8031      6.04847  N = 2782 
between    1.225855     -.8186155  5.689049  i = 26 
within    .7044398      -1.70508    3.98621  T = 107 
Bonds and Money 
Market 
Instruments/GDP: 
      
overall  -.3619342    1.555666      -11.48691  2.28638  N = 2782 
between    1.006243      -2.545149  1.356671  i = 26 
within    1.202566     -9.423457  4.357364  T = 107 
Foreign 
Assets/GDP : 
      
overall  -.0500115    1.424475    -10.41371     4.39025  N = 2782 
between    .9648011     -3.004784  2.049346  i = 26 




      
overall  -.1173586    .6475688      -2.84091    3.37763  N = 2782 
between    .3903511      -1.053855  .7195766  i = 26 
within    .5222826      -2.723352  3.178975  T = 107 
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PANEL II 
(11 EU countries, time period: Q1 1980 - Q3 1998) 
VARIABLES  
(all in natural 
logarithms) 
Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max Observations
Bank 
Lending/GDP: 
      
overall  1.22105     .3084573       .2578       1.8361  N = 836 
between    .2339891     .7879128     1.485426  i = 11 
within    .2128679     .3188967       1.816  T = 76 
Real GDP per 
capita: 
      
overall  3.70062     1.593753      .92294      6.38221  N = 836 
between    1.665629     1.132671     6.149226  i = 11 
within    .122152     3.448473     4.035998  T = 76 
Interest rate:        
overall  2.026948     .5582257      .69315      3.27911  N = 836 
between    .3837639     1.503318     2.630425  i = 11 
within    .4213899     .4951338     2.846154  T = 76 
Deposits/GDP:        
overall  1.323948     1.376972     -.06464     5.66468  N = 836 
between    1.422153     .5246633     5.563357  i = 11 
within    .2349371     .4695954     1.918031  T = 76 
Bonds and Money 
Market 
Instruments/GDP: 
      
overall  -.7647585    1.687273      -7.46515    1.61596  N = 836 
between    1.591446     -4.393777  1.201519  i = 11 
within    .735987      -3.836131  2.090602  T = 76 
Foreign 
Assets/GDP : 
      
overall  .0386476     .9384367      -2.11716    4.39025  N = 836 
between    .8521703     -.9882891  1.415759  i = 11 




      
overall  -.1118892    .3161619       -1.10687    .74724  N = 836 
between    .27964    -.6545087    .3311328  i = 11 
within    .1696575      -.8092806  .492927  T = 76 
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PANEL III 
(26 EU countries, time period: Q1 1999 - Q3 2006) 
VARIABLES  
(all in natural 
logarithms) 
Mean Std.  Dev.  Min  Max Observations
Bank 
Lending/GDP: 
      
overall  .9634145     1.106034      -3.238277  3.393542  N =    806 
between    1.10247      -2.791807  3.356674  n =     26 
within    .2305814     .0820281     3.11783  T =      31 
Real GDP per 
capita: 
      
overall  6.051169     2.678176     1.349683     12.66796  N =    806 
between    2.72726     1.443205     12.42524  n =     26 
within    .108951     5.524112     6.514984  T =      31 
Interest rate:        
overall  1.481935     .5696396     -.027029    3.555348  N =    806 
between    .4792344     .7142627     3.069609  n =     26 
within    .3215317     .4369591     2.581849  T =      31 
Deposits/GDP:        
overall  1.295129     1.519575     -2.773942  6.048469  N =    806 
between    1.528612     -2.488645  5.997196  n =     26 
within    .2439945      -.3845825  1.981867  T =      31 
Bonds and Money 
Market 
Instruments/GDP: 
      
overall  -.0795288    1.750138      -5.396411  2.286376  N =    806 
between    1.695878     -3.744696  1.986972  n =     26 
within    .5423645     -2.622679  1.495855  T =      31 
Foreign 
Assets/GDP : 
      
overall  -.080594     2.21202      -10.41371  3.237338  N =    806 
between    2.240099     -9.219169  2.771956  n =     26 




      
overall  -.0051241    .7618601     -2.477355  2.884752  N =    806 
between    .6818788       -1.203865  2.3363  n =     26 
within    .364417      -1.446608  2.090333  T =      31 
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APPENDIX III – Correlation Matrix  
PANEL I 
(26 EU countries, time period: Q1 1980 - Q3 2006) 
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APPENDIX IV – Panel unit root tests – Levin-Lin-Chu 
 
PANEL I 
(26 EU countries, time period: Q1 1980 - Q3 2006) 
VARIABLES     coefficients          t-value           t-star           P>t         N 
Bank Lending/GDP   -0.06969 -9.557  -3.14460 0.0008  2650 
Real GDP per capita  -0.00553 -2.569  -2.56682 0.0051  2650 
Interest rate  -0.02185 -7.163  -7.15592 0.0000  2650 
Deposits/GDP  -0.07016 -9.841  -2.06946 0.0193  2650 
Bonds and Money 
Market Instruments/GDP 
-0.00747 -2.350  -2.34752 0.0094  2650 
Foreign Assets /GDP  -0.09831 -12.542  -5.90625 0.0000  2650 
Foreign Assets/Foreign 
Liabilities 
-0.02127 -5.500  -5.49457 0.0000  2650 
 
PANEL II 
(11 EU countries, time period: Q1 1980 - Q3 1998) 
VARIABLES     coefficients          t-value           t-star           P>t         N 
Bank Lending/GDP   -0.00809 -1.393  -1.38352 0.0833  750 
Real GDP per capita  -0.59586 -17.469 -15.70921 0.0000 750 
Interest rate  -0.02295 -3.201  -3.17881 0.0007  750 
Deposits/GDP  -0.15426 -7.803  -2.74708 0.0030  750 
Bonds and Money 
Market Instruments/GDP 
-0.01034 -3.496  -3.47149 0.0003  750 
Foreign Assets /GDP  -0.42727 -22.067 -19.26620 0.0000 750 
Foreign Assets/Foreign 
Liabilities 
-0.01434 -2.587  -2.56892 0.0051  750 
 
PANEL III 
(26 EU countries, time period: Q1 1999 - Q3 2006) 
VARIABLES     coefficients          t-value           t-star           P>t         N 
Bank Lending/GDP   -0.85254 -48.179 -43.23545 0.0000 750 
Real GDP per capita  -1.01649 -28.060 -18.99290 0.0000 750 
Interest rate  -0.04239 -6.549  -6.34443 0.0000  750 
Deposits/GDP  -0.40333 -13.622  -5.38484 0.0000 750 
Bonds and Money 
Market Instruments/GDP 
-0.00984 -4.578  -4.42858 0.0000  750 
Foreign Assets /GDP  -0.12876 -7.677  -2.75593 0.0029  750 
Foreign Assets/Foreign 
Liabilities 
-0.17329 -9.362  -1.78286 0.0373  750 
   26
Table 1 – Pooled OLS Robust Estimations (*) 
PANEL I 
(26 EU countries, time period: Q1 1980- Q3 2006) 
  EQUATION I  EQUATION II 
Real GDP per capita    
coef. .0759668  .0781048 
T-statistic 16.45  17.94 
P-value 0.000  0.000 
Interest rate    
coef. .1215754  .1240972 
T-statistic 9.07  9.16 
P-value 0.000  0.000 
Deposits/GDP    
coef. .2969024  .2941063 
T-statistic 21.86  21.71 
P-value 0.000  0.000 
Bonds and Money Market 
Instruments/GDP 
  
coef. -.0207019  
T-statistic -2.49  
P-value 0.013  
Foreign Assets/GDP    
coef. .3726493  .3642184 
T-statistic 36.98  38.09 




coef. -.26435  -.2593609 
T-statistic -9.30  -9.21 
P-value 0.000  0.000 
constant    
coef. .0411059  .0389916 
T-statistic 2.38  2.25 
P-value 0.017  0.024 
   
  R-squared = 0.6570  R-squared = 0.6563 
  F (6,  2775) = 854.07 
Prob>F= 0.0000 
F (5,  2776) = 1013.22 
Prob>F=0.0000 
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PANEL II 
(11 EU countries, time period: Q1 1980 - Q3 1998) 
  EQUATION I  EQUATION II 
Real GDP per capita     
coef.  .063581 .033739 
T-statistic  8.58 5.52 
P-value  0.000 0.000 
Interest rate    
coef.  .0763293 .0372257 
T-statistic  2.70 1.29 
P-value  0.007 0.198 
Deposits/GDP    
coef.  .1248954 .1225994 
T-statistic  14.06 14.70 
P-value  0.000 0.000 
Bonds and Money Market 
Instruments/GDP 
  
coef.  .0581144  
T-statistic  5.72  
P-value  0.000  
Foreign Assets/GDP    
coef.  .0461512 .0694157 
T-statistic  3.24 4.98 




coef.  -.1694083 -.1159745 
T-statistic  -3.83 -2.54 
P-value  0.000 0.011 
constant    
coef.  .4582903 .6029935 
T-statistic  3.69 5.06 
P-value  0.000 0.000 
   
  R-squared = 0.3799  R-squared = 0.3347 
  F (81,   754) = 7.65 
Prob>F = 0.0000 
F (80,   755) = 8.04 
Prob>F= 0.0000 
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PANEL III 
(26 EU countries, time period: Q1 1999 - Q3 2006) 
  EQUATION I  EQUATION II 
Real GDP per capita     
coef.  .2623998 .4189429 
T-statistic  3.29 4.79 
P-value  0.001 0.000 
Interest rate    
coef.  .0426578 .0868218 
T-statistic  1.77 3.18 
P-value  0.078 0.002 
Deposits/GDP    
coef.  .2303884 .3419657 
T-statistic  4.50 4.90 
P-value  0.000 0.000 
Bonds and Money Market 
Instruments/GDP 
  
coef.  .1589014  
T-statistic  7.77  
P-value  0.000  
Foreign Assets/GDP    
coef.  .2198304 .2526167 
T-statistic  7.25 7.92 




coef.  -.1545319 -.2124955 
T-statistic  -6.36 -8.62 
P-value  0.000 0.000 
constant    
coef.  -.4096939 -1.143916 
T-statistic  -1.11 -2.87 
P-value  0.268 0.004 
   
  R-squared = 0.9760  R-squared = 0.9711 
  F (31,   774) = 3158.20 
Prob > F= 0.0000 
F (30,   775) = 2901.07 
Prob>F= 0.0000 
  N = 806  N = 806 
 
(*) Time and country dummies were included in the estimations and the obtained results are available from 
the author upon request. 
 
 